Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Fried, for

being here again, and I want to bring up something you and I discussed

the last time you were at a hearing, but, first, when I see

Russia, I see a big bear growling, with ‘‘KGB’’ still written across

its chest in the name of Putin, and I do not trust the Russians.

They would lie when the truth would suit them better. But be that

as it may, this $1 billion; where are we getting that money?

What kind of accounts, Social Security? I mean, where

is it coming from?

I would like to know exactly where it is coming from.

If you would put that in writing, I would appreciate it.

But going on to another issue, it seems to me that,

based upon your testimony, you said that, in 2006, the South

Ossetians voted for a split from Georgia in a referendum. It is

questionable whether or not it was fair, under our terms. The facts

are still in dispute, and the jury is still out on what happened between

Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia.

But be that as it may, some have suggested that the United

States’ position in Georgia is hypocritical, given, at our last discussion,

the United States’ support for Kosovo independence, despite

Kosovo having been long recognized, according to the Serbians, as

a part of Serbia. In fact, in the wake of the United States’ recognition

of Kosovo’s secession last spring, Mr. Putin warned, according

to the New York Times, that ‘‘Russia will feel entitled to do the

same thing with South Ossetia and Georgia, another breakaway region.’’

So can you respond to this argument and explain to me why we

believe in self-determination for some folks, as American foreign

policy, but we do not believe in self-determination for other folks,

such as South Ossetia?

Excuse me, Dr. Fried. We are running out of time.

I just want to be clear. It is American foreign policy that we do

not support self-determination for regions that want to break away

from some other region, as a general rule.

And Kosovo was an exception.

And we justified that because of our own political and

military interests in the region. We justified it.

What factors do we use to violate the premise that we

do not believe in separate self-determination? What factors come

into play, so if it comes up again, like with Chechnya or some other

place, we will know what factors to apply of self-determination,

whether we are for it or whether we are against it?

All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.